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HOW VALUES CREATE VALUE: 
 




1.  NORMS AND VALUES, REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
From the Confusion over Confucian Values... 
Values are to a society what character is to a person: it reveals his true inner self, yet is difficult to 
describe in exact terms. Moreover, a person's character may show in his actions in various, sometimes 
contradictory ways so that it may be difficult to induce a person's character from his deeds. Asian values, 
elusive as they are, have been regarded as a cause of the economic rise of a number of Asian countries. 
Yet some decades earlier, Confucian values were quoted as a cause of underdevelopment of some Asian 
countries. Has the recent financial crisis also been due to them, in some way, or do we have to wait for 
economic recovery in order to attribute that to Confucian values?  Max Weber, who first studied the 
impact of values on economic development, was more careful when he presented the results of his 
research. The Spirit of Capitalism is congruent with the rise of the Protestant Ethic, he said; but he 
claimed no causal relationship.  
 
... To Normative Frameworks as Social Capital 
Given the state-of-the-art of sociological value research, it appears over-ambitious to expect solid results 
from a study of values as determinants of social capital and economic development. For the researcher, 
norms have a major advantage over values: they are more specific and can be recognized by the 
negative sanctions imposed in their breach; or by the positive sanctions associated with their 
observance. In our own research, we will therefore place a major emphasis on the normative framework, 
or, in the language of the New Institutional Economics (NIE), the institutional framework;  and we will do 
so in microfinance: a field where norms and standards are quite specific and where both, the breach of 
norms and their observance, are of consequence. In the real world of finance,  regulation and 
supervision are the key issues: how to establish norms – this is what regulation is about; and how to 
enforce norms – this is what supervision is about. Both are closely interrelated, regulation without 
supervision being empty, supervision without regulation being blind. Therefore, effective regulation 
requires effective supervision.  In Table 1 the corresponding social science and microfinance terminology 
are juxtaposed.  
 
We thus define social capital as the shared normative system of a group or organization which shapes 
the capacity of people to work together and produce results according to the group‘s or organization‘s 
purpose. The specific norms of a group or organization are in turn grounded in values, which in their 
totality form the subculture of a group or the corporate culture of an organization. Groups or 
organizations may form part of larger entities, sectors or sub-systems which are guided by more general 
norms: different schools are part of the school system, while schools and universities are elements of the 
educational system, which is somehow shaped by basic educational values. Banks, finance companies 
and insurance agencies are part of the formal financial sector with its own policy and legal framework, 
while formal-sector banks and informal-sector moneylenders are elements of the financial system, which 
is somehow shaped by economic values. In practical terms, regulation is the social capital of the 
(micro-) financial system. This may include a hierarchy of up to three or more levels of regulation and 
                                                 
1 This paper is part of a joint study of Social Capital Formation in Microfinance: The Case of the Philippines, 
by Llanto, Quiñones & Seibel. The study is being supported through a grant by  the Pacific Basin Research 
Center at Soka University of America in Calabasas, California, in the framework of its program on Social 
Capital Formation and Use in Asia and the P acific. Grant recipient is the Asian and Pacific Development 
Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where Quiñones is Director of the Poverty Alleviation & Employment 
Programme.   2  
 
supervision: (a) fully institutionalized regulation, e.g., by the legislature (policymaking) and by the central 
bank or bank superintendency as a first-tier regulatory authority (bank supervision); (b) self-regulation as 
delegated to a second-tier regulatory authority such as an auditing federation of a network of (micro-) 
financial institutions; and (c) internal regulation by formal and nonformal financial institutions through 
their own rules and regulations, which includes supervision through organs such as boards and internal 
revision departments or auditing committees (sound practices). Ideally, all three levels are integrated 
through an effective management information and reporting system (MIS). 
 
Table 1.1: Social science and microfinance glossary 
 








Norms  Policies 
Laws, by-laws 
Rules and regulations 
Standards 
Habits  Practices 
Good, sound, best practices 
Social institutions  Sectors 




Management and staff 
Customers, clients, users 
Subculture  Corporate culture 
Normative agency  Policymaker 
Enforcement agency  Regulatory authority 





Devolution  Decentralization 




Social and political efficacy  Viability and sustainability 
Role conflict 









Differential association  Adverse selection 
Sanctions: 
Positive sanctions, rewards 









Social interaction  Transactions 
Supply and demand 
Communication  Information 
Generalized means of exchange  Currency unit (US$, Peso)   3  
 
There are formal norms which are written and binding. They may apply at the sectoral level, including 
government policies like interest rate regulation, and laws, such as the banking law; at the organizational 
level, like rules and by-laws as defined in the operations manual of a financial organization; or at the 
individual level, as laid down in a job description or an employment contract. There are also norms which 
govern the interaction between entities of different levels, such as the terms and conditions of financial 
contracts between primary and secondary cooperatives or banks and individuals. Furthermore, there are 
unwritten or informal norms of varying degrees of specificy and obligation (good practices), with a 
tendency towards formalization if considered important enough. 
 
Through socialization, which may include education, training and experience-on-the-job, the norms and 
values are to be adopted, or internalized, by individuals in the form of knowledge, skills and habits. They 
are enforced through positive and negative sanctions, which act as incentives or penalties, respectively. 
Social conflict may arise between individuals who are involved in an organization at different levels, as in 
the case of the principal-agency dilemma: the shareholders of a bank, as the principal, may be interested 
in present or future profits, which are either distributed now or added to the bank’s equity to generate 
future profits; the managers, as agents for the principal, may have a personal interest in high salaries and 
perks such as company cars and fancy business trips; while field staff, as agents for the managers, may 
seek out under-the-table payments when disbursing subsidized loans.  
 
When put into practice, the norms of a group or an organization lead to concrete behavior (good 
practices) with an observable or measurable output. This is then the social capital-in-action of a group or 
organization: the actual implementation of social capital as a shared system of norms and underlying 
values. In case of economic organizations, the output are products or services which can be measured in 
Dollar (or Peso) terms and in various efficiency and effectiveness ratios (SEEP 1995). 
 
Measuring the value of social capital in microfinance: 
Microfinance is defined as a sector of formal, semiformal and informal financial institutions 
providing financial services to the microeconomy.  Microfinance services comprise 
microsavings and microcredit (and perhaps other financial services such as microinsurance, 
microleasing, transfer services), thereby allocating scarce resources to microinvestments with 
the highest marginal rates of return. Two types of institutions are included: in a narrow sense, 
small local financial institutions such as rural banks, savings and credit cooperatives, credit 
NGOs and rotating savings and credit associations.; in a wider sense, national or regional 
banks and development finance institutions (DFIs) with microfinance services for small 
savers and borrowers.  
 
The microeconomy is the primary market of MFIs and includes such populations segments as 
small and microentrepreneurs, small farmers and the landless, women and low-income people 
much of which falls into the informal sector  which escapes an exact d efinition ( you know it 
when you see it). 
 
There are  three assessment criteria for the value of social capital in microfinance institutions 
(MFIs):  
 
•  viability, which entails covering all costs from the interest income (, plus a profit margin; 
•  sustainability, which entails mobilizing one’s own resources and maintaining their value 
in the face of inflation; 
•  outreach to all segments of the population including low-income people. 
   4  
 
Accordingly, there are three major measures of the effectiveness of microfinance  institutions 
(MFIs), or the payoff of the social capital in microfinance.
2  Viability  as measured by the 
operational self-sufficiency ratio
3, which is in turn related to measures of  portfolio quality, 
refers to the extent to which an institution covers its costs, has its loans repaid, and makes a 
profit. Sustainability has two aspects: (a) measured by the financial self-sufficiency ratio
4, it 
refers to the extent to which an institution not only covers its operational costs but also 
preserves the value of i ts resources, accounting for subsidies and the effects of inflation; (b) 
measured by the internal resources ratio
5, it refers to the extent to which an MFI mobilizes 
its own financial resources internally (equity capital, retained earnings and savings deposits) 
instead of depending on government or donor funding. Outreach,  which is closely related to 
measures of staff effectiveness, or  financial deepening, refers to the extent to which all 
segments of the population, including low-income people, have access to financial 
institutions and their services. It is usually measured in terms of the absolute number of 
customers and the amount of financial services, particularly the number of depositors and 
borrowers and the amounts of deposits and loans outstanding.  
 
2.  NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE SOCIAL CAPITAL 
From Financial Repression as Negative Social Capital... 
Like financial capital, which may have a positive or negative balance, social capital comes in two 
forms: positive and negative. Positive social capital has a p ositive yield; it benefits society and its 
members. Negative social capital has a negative yield; its costs exceed its benefits. The former makes 
a society richer, the latter poorer. Countries remain underdeveloped if their overall negative social 
capital exceeds their positive social capital. Development ensues only to the extent that positive social 
capital is being generated in excess of negative social capital. In the past, financial repression, 
encompassing over-regulation and state interference, has b een one of the most powerful forms of 
negative social capital in Third World countries (McKinnon 1973; Fry 1988). In the 1950s, the 
Philippines (like Ghana, Kenya and Uganda) had great promise as a truly developing country. Yet, in 
the decades thereafter, it greatly lagged behind the Tiger-states. A main factor was the amount of 
negative social capital it amassed through financial repression. Another, related factor was political 
repression through dictatorship, which implies the absence of democratic control over political and 
economic processes. In several Asian countries, this has included rampant political interference in 
lending decisions, which recently led to the Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
However, financial repression is not all evil intentions. Based  on the poverty hypothesis, which 
underlies modernization theory, it can also be a well-meaning social policy. The majority of people in 
Third World countries are poor. They are assumed to be unable to organize themselves, and incapable 
of self-help. In the vein of this hypothesis, countries are poor because people are poor and helpless; 
and people remain poor as long as their countries are poor. With regard to finance, this means that 
poor people are too poor to save; and poor countries are too poor to domestically mobilize financial 
resources. 
 
The obvious solution was capital transfer from rich to poor countries and the disbursement of cheap 
credit to the poor. Special development finance institutions were created at international, bilateral and 
                                                 
2 SEEP/CALMEADOW, Financial Ratio Analysis of Micro-Finance Institutions. New York: Pact Publications, 
1995 
3 Financial Income/(Financial Costs + Operating Costs + Loan Loss Provision) 
4 Financial Income/(Financial Costs + Operating Costs + Loan Loss Provision + Imputed Cost of Capital) 
5 (Equity + Retained Earnings + Deposits)/Average Performing Assets. In donor-driven MFIs, the Donations 
and Grants Ratio is more popular.   5  
 
national l evels to channel the credit, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Development Bank of the Philippines (1946) and Land Bank of the 
Philippines. In the process, national governments took upon themselves the combined roles of 
planner, banker, supplier, marketing agency, producer and welfare provider. Among their main 
financial instruments were interest rate ceilings and subsidies, credit targeting, credit rationing and 
agricultural price controls. Subsidizing interest rates on loans and directing subsidized credit to 
priority crops and borrowers became major development strategies, with agricultural production, 
rather than rural development, the o bjective. Institutions were instrumentalized as conduits of 
government funds, hampering the growth – and oftentimes even the emergence – of self-reliant local 
financial intermediaries. As credit was only available for government-directed purposes, farmers 
tended to take a dvantage of the fungibility of money, diverting it to other purposes and subverting 
project additionality. Due to resource scarcity, subsidized lending projects were narrow in scope and 
void of dynamic growth. Given a wide discrepancy between credit supply and demand, credit 
rationing became one of the principal strategies in credit allocation. Administered credit showed a 
persistent tendency of reaching the wrong recipients in wrong quantities at the wrong time for wrong 
objectives. Government officials and experts substituted their own rationality and decisions for those 
of the farmers and the market. This led to crop and project failures, sometimes on a large scale. 
Farmers were practically forced into diversion of funds. Factor allocations were distorted. In many 
cases, the impact of development projects, financed with hard-currency loans to be eventually repaid 
from incomes in ever-deteriorating local currency, was negative. Ceilings on interest rates prevented 
financial institutions from transaction cost-covering interest rates. As transaction costs tend  to be 
constant per loan independent of loan size, interest rate ceilings and credit subsidies led to 
concentrations in the loan portfolio, allocating relatively large loans to a few big farmers, neglecting 
the small and the poor. Banks shifted transaction  costs to borrowers, including legal and illegal 
charges, making cheap credit expensive to the end-user. As banks acted as conduits for government 
funds, rather than applying credit policies of their own, subsidized credit created its own high risks 
and associated default rates. Undercapitalization and contractions in the lending volume were 
inevitable concomitants.  
 
In a number of cases, an inverted interest rate structure, with interest rates on deposits above lending 
rates, discouraged any type of commercially oriented banking and created systemic dependency on 
government and donor funding. Subsidized funds were channeled through specialized credit 
institutions which were usually barred from deposit mobilization. As a result, deposit facilities were 
notably absent in many rural areas, increasing the dependency of the farmer on subsidized credit and 
money lenders. Post Office Savings Banks offered interest rates with negative real returns and used 
their funds to subsidize the government budget. Potential savers, big and small, were discouraged. 
This hurt farmers and microentrepreneurs by restricting their self-financing capacity and prevented the 
emergence of institutions as financial intermediaries. Repayment rates of subsidized credit programs 
were usually abysmally low as neither bank staff nor beneficiaries, and least of all politicians, took the 
donors’ and the government’s easy money seriously. A host of factors have thus militated against the 
evolution of financial markets, as succinctly expressed in a  book title, Undermining Rural 
Development with Cheap Credit (Adams et al., 1984).  
 
Tight regulation has repressed the growth of the financial system, with interest rate controls, credit 
targeting, interest rate subsidies, politically motivated loan forgiveness, and legal restrictions on the 
growth of the financial infrastructure the chief instruments of financial repression. This has led to low 
bank densities, a low degree of the monetization of the economy, grossly inadequate financial 
services,  and bank crashes which annihilated people’s savings and eroded their confidence in the 
financial system. Microeconomically, this has led to severely restricted and distorted allocations of 
resources, with a lack of growth in income and employment among all segments of the population, 
including the poor. At the macroeconomic level, this has led to high inflation rates, high levels of 
external endebtedness and low economic growth rates.  
 
 
   6  
 
.... to Deregulation and the Mobilization of Positive Social Capital 
 
Since the 1980s, the assumption that the poor cannot save and than poor countries cannot mobilize 
financial resources domestically has been gradually dropped. The poor do save,  their marginal 
propensity to save being usually much higher than that of the non-poor. With appropriate strategies 
and products, local and national financial institutions can mobilize deposits. And there are numerous 
instruments governments can use to mobilize domestic resources. Many governments have therefore 
moved from a policy of financial repression to a policy of deregulation. The most important 
instruments have been:  
 
•  the deregulation of interest rates, permitting financial institutions (a) to offer attractive savings 
products with positive real returns and (b) to charge interest rates on loans which cover their costs 
and risks and allow for a profit margin 
•  exchange rate deregulation to ease the free flow of private capital 
•  the deregulation of bank entry and branching, including the provision of legal forms for local 
banks with lower equity requirements, 
 
… Accompanied by a Deregulation of the Trade Regime 
 
Pitfalls of deregulation: Yet, deregulation has met with two pitfalls: the first is a lack of effective 
supervision of financial institutions, frequently embedded into an autocratic polical economy, with 
massive political interference in the financial system, as in virtually all countries hit by the Asian 
financial crisis; but less so in the Philippines than say in Indonesia. The second pitfall lies in the 
reluctance of governments to fully implement their own deregulation policies. This has had several 
root-causes: the attempt by politicians to buy votes by providing cheap credit in their constituencies, 
particularly, in the Philippines,  in the face of a failed land reform; the rent-seeking behavior of those 
who directly benefit from preferential credit disbursement in various legal and non-legal ways; the 
sheltering of disbursement agencies against competition; and, last not least, the vested interest in the 
continued supply of easy money among those who hold positions in national and international 
disbursement agencies.  
 
Interest rates: Administrative ceilings on interest rates, based on the Anti-Usury Law of 1916 and 
replaced in 1973 by a more flexible regime of the central bank, have been effectively abolished in 
1983 as part of the IMF-World Bank reform package. Since then, financial institutions are free to set 
their on interest rates on deposits and loans of various maturities according to market criteria. Yet, the 
government continued to use legislated interest rates as a means of directing preferential credit to 
priority sectors. This has distorted financial markets. 
 
Directed credit: In the Philippines, preferential credit is a prime example of contradictions between 
policies and practices and their overlapping effects. With the realization of the bad effects on the 
financial system and the quantity and quality of financial services and under IMF and World Bank 
pressure, major channels of subsidized credit, particularly through Rural Banks, were closed off in the 
late 1980s. Yet, despite that action and a strong stance against directed credit by the governmental 
Agricultural Credit Policy Council, ACPC, large numbers of preferential credit programs continue to 
exist.  
 
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), RA 6657 of 1988, together with a host of other 
laws and ordinances, provides for concessional and collateral-free credit to small landowners, farmers 
and farmers’ organizations. This has made the Landbank of the Philippines, the main provider of such 
credit, unviable. Landbank provided credit at 12%, further lowered in 1994 (AO 162) to 10%, while 
its credit costs ranged from 15% to 29%, depending on the source of funds (Dingcong 7/1997:10-11) 
Besides undermining the h ealth of Landbank, this has created fiscal and inflationary pressures; and, 
micro-economically, it has directed credit flows into activities with low rates of return which would 
be unprofitable at market rates.   7  
 
 
With an overall repayment rate of reportedly 90.4% in 23 selected agricultural credit programs as of 
12/1996, performance has greatly improved compared to the 1980s, when repayment generally was 
below 50%. But performance varied widely, with only three out of 23 programs reporting repayment 
rates of 100%. The performance of most of the 13 programs channeled through cooperatives or 
borrower groups was poor, varying from 11% to 95% repayment; while the five programs with direct 
lending to individual borrowers, accounting for the larger portion of the overall portfolio, performed 
much better, with repayment rates between 75% and 100%.  
 
The overall effect of preferential interest rates is contrary to the lawmakers intentions: ”The effect of 
this is a decrease in the supply of credit to targeted sectors... At the ceiling rate the amount lenders are 
willing to provide is smaller than the level they would have been willing to lend at the market rate, 
and less than the amount borrowers would like to avail of at the rate. With excess demand for credit, 
the group most discriminated against are the small borrowers, the sector which the law aims to 
protect.” (Dingcong 7/1997:11) 
 
There is a large number of specialized government financial institutions which are involved in 
directed credit. Despite the fact that “international experience over the past 40 years suggest(ed) that 
specialized institutions, particularly those that have attracted foreign resources, have failed 
completely,” (Dingcong 1997:17) the government keeps them alive and continues to establish new 
ones. The latest creation has been the People‘s Credit and Finance Corporation, PCFC, created in 
1995 and operational as of 6/1996, an offshoot of LBP with the objective of poverty alleviation 
through loans to NGOs and FIs. 
 
Bank entry and branching: Until the late 1980s, regulation on bank entry and branching was highly 
restrictive. Restrictions comprised the prohibition of new banks; the branching into areas categorized 
as overbranched; increased reserve requirements; and increased capitalization requirements. Between 
1988 and 1994, these restrictions were gradually removed, leading to an increased level of 
competition and relative improvement in efficiency of the banking system. Between 1986 and 1989, 
the number of bank offices had slightly declined, while during the liberalization period, 1989-93, their 
number grew rapidly: from 3,565 to 4,657, or 29.8%, and continued to grow thereafter. This growth 
has been stronger among commercial banks than among rural banks, which showed growth rates of 
14.6% during 1989-93 and 12.6% 1993-95. 
 
Table 2.1:  Offices of bank and non-bank institutions in the Philippines, 
1986-1995 
 
Type of   1986  1989  1993  1995 
financial institution  No.  % ch.
1  No.  % ch.
1  No.  % ch.
1  No.  % ch.
1 
Commercial banks  1,766  ·  1,765  -0.2  2,377  +34.7  3,047  +28.2 
Rural banks  1,083  ·  1,043  -3.7  1,195  +14.6  1,346  +12.6 
All banks  3,614  ·  3,588  -0.7  4,657  +29.8  5,569  +19.6 
Non-bank FIs  2,283  ·  3,465  +51.8  5,035  +45.3  6,575  +30.6 
All FIs  5,979  ·  7,135  +19.3  9,809  +37.5  12,266  +25.0 
1 Change in percent    Adopted from: Bangko Sentral Pilipinas, The Philippine Financial System Fact 
Book 1995 
 
Intermediation taxes: Efforts towards financial liberalization started in 1981 but have not resulted in 
the total elimination of intermediation taxes on the financial sector, impinging on its efficiency. These 
taxes include the credit quota schemes which direct banks to set aside a portion of their loanable funds 
for targeted sectors at preferential terms, the gross receipts tax, the deposit retention scheme 
restricting the free flow of resources between different regions of the country, tax on interest income 
and reserve requirements.   8  
 
Reserve requirements on deposits were as high as 25% until 1991, resulting in lower interest rates 
on deposits and higher rates on loans  – thus  putting a damper on the mobilization of deposits. 
Between 1993 and 1997, reserve requirements on deposit liabilities of commercial banks were 
decreased to 22% in 1993, 19% in 1994, 15% in 1995, 14% in 1/1997 and 13% as of 7/1997. Reserve 
requirements on savings and time deposits of thrift banks, and even more so of rural banks, were 
lower, declining, in the case of rural banks, from 14% in 1993 to 5% as of 7/1997 (Dingcong 
7/1997:36). 
 
Prudential regulation and supervision: To fully mobilize the social capital potential of a financial 
system through deregulation, three things have to be in place: macroeconomic stability, prudential 
regulation, and effective supervision. Deregulation can only succeed under conditions of 
macroeconomic stability. An extreme case is the Latin American Southern Cone, where liberalization 
collapsed during the early 80s under conditions of hyperinflation. In the Philippines, liberalization 
efforts were hampered, throughout the 80s, by widely fluctuating inflation rates. The problem here 
was not so much one of absolute magnitude, but of volatility and unpredictability. Between 1992 and 
1997, inflation was down to single-digits, but then the Asian financial crisis hit in 1997/98. Prudential 
regulation and supervision are a major factor influencing the activities and the quality of financial 
institutions. There are bank and non-bank financial institutions under the authority of the central bank, 
which is the only institution exerting effective control; cooperatives under the Cooperative 
Development Authority which requires annual financial reporting but lacks the capacity to effectively 
supervise their activities; NGOs which are registered but not regulated or supervised; and informal 
financial institutions, like money lenders and savings and credit associations, which are unregistered 
and unsupervised. Whether regulation and supervision have a positive or negative influence depends 
on the policy environment. Under a repressive regime, the central bank stifles the growth of the 
formal financial sector, which puts nonformal finance at an enormous competitive advantage. In a 
liberal environment, however, prudential regulation and supervision can be very beneficial. Among 
MFIs in the Philippines, Rural Banks are regulated and supervised by the central bank, while 
cooperatives and NGOs are not: to the advantage of the former and the detriment of the latter. 
 
 
3.  GRAMEEN BANKING: (SELF-) REGULATED BUT NOT SUPERVISED 
CAN MIRACLES BE REPLICATED? 
 
The Grameen Bank (GB) of Bangladesh, formally launched in June 1979,  is widely considered as 
one of the world’s most successful financial institutions banking with the poor. On its website
6, the 
Bank reports as of 31/12/95 an outreach to 2.06 million “member/borrowers”, 94% of them poor 
women, in 36,142 villages of Bangladesh, reached through 1068 branches. Cumulative loan 
disbursements are given as US$1.84b; loans outstanding, according to the balance sheet, amount to 
$298.8m, total assets to $474.5m, and ”deposits & other funds” to $127.47m. Many have been deeply 
impressed by these figures and GB’s publicity, particularly since the Microcredit Summit of February 
1997 in Washington D.C.  
 
Grameen’s success is explained by its social capital, a self-regulated normative framework not 
supervised by any authorized agency, which prescribes its operations in detail
7: 
 
•  a focus on poor women, gathering detailed target group information and using rigid selection 
criteria to bar the non-poor from access to its services 
•  organizing the prospective borrowers in groups of five and centers of about six groups each which 
in turn come under a Grameen branch 
•  a credit-first program design, initially financed with donor or government funds 
                                                 
6 http://www.citechco.net/grameen/bank/stat.htm: Statistical Update 
7 CARD – Center for Agriculture and Rural Development, Operations Manual. CARD Research Unit, San Pablo 
City, The Philippines, 4/1998   9  
 
•  internal resource mobilization through a compulsory savings component, supplemented  by 
external donor or commercial resources 
•  reliance on peer pressure and joint liability of solidarity groups as a special type of risk 
management, which allows Grameen to lend without collateral 
•  strict credit discipline with absolute insistence on timely r epayment (except during natural 
disasters)  
•  weekly center meetings with compulsory punctual attendance, where a pledge is sung and 
payments are transacted with a Grameen branch officer in the presence of all members 
•  special conditions of financial contracts, comprising a series of one-year repeat loans to individual 
borrowers at market rates of interest, starting small (around $50) and, contingent upon  the group 
members’ repayment performance, growing bigger in predetermined steps and amounts, 
repayable in weekly instalments, with a five percent up-front deduction to be paid into the group’s 
emergency loan fund 
•  adoption of Grameen’s  Ten Decisions of personal discipline to be followed in one’s daily life, 
such as growing fruits and vegetables in the backyard; abstention from drinking, smoking and 
gambling; improving one’s housing; building latrines; safe drinking water for better health; 
investing in the children’s education 
•  intensive training of members and staff to adopt the attitudes, practices and underlying norms and 
values of the Grameen approach. 
 
Despite some criticism, there can be little doubt that Prof. Yunus, though not the only one, has 
achieved miracles in Bangladesh: providing short-term microcredit and longer-term housing loans to 
large numbers of the poor, making them repay their loans on time, turning some of the poor into 
telecommunication innovators who offer mobile phone services in remote villages and, last not least, 
freeing women from some of  the fetters of repression. With donor support channeled through 
Grameen Trust and Cashpor, there are now Grameen programs in 26 countries including the 
Philippines where replication started in 1989 on a broad scale. Can the Grameen miracle be replicated 
be replicated in the Philippines? Is Grameen b anking a form of social capital that can be effectively 
exported? 
 
Grameen Replicators in the Philippines: Struggling for Donor Funds... 
 
Our analysis is based on studies in the Philippines of 27 replicators by ACPC
8 in 1993; six replicators  
by APDC/UNDP
9 in 1996; three replicators by GTZ
10 in 1997; and two supplementary case studies by  
Seibel in August 1998. ACPC, a government institution, examined its own experience as program 
executing agency with the 27 Grameen replicators in the Philippines, reduced by attrition to 23, as per 
6/1993. While highlighting some positive aspects, such as a ”significant impact on the standard of 
living of its beneficiaries”, ”high repayment rates from 94% to 98% (averaging 96.8% in 1993)”
11, 
and ”the poor are capable of saving on a regular basis” (p. 85), the facts yielded a rather dismal 
picture: In a country with a diversified MFI infrastructure of, at present, over 800 rural banks, 3000 
credit cooperatives and 600 credit NGOs, 23 Grameen replicators (including banks, cooperatives and 
NGOs) had a negligible outreach, in 1993, of 4766 individuals (89% of them active borrowers, 184 on 
average), even after an  expansion to 16,432 participants in 12/1995 (95% of them active borrowers).  
                                                 
8 Agricultural Credit Policy Council, An Evaluation of the Grameen Bank Replication Project in the Philippines. 
ACPC, Manila 10/1995. ACPC monitors the Grameen replicators periodically, but does not any formal sense 
supervise them. As NGOs, the Grameen replicators are unsupervised. 
9 I. Getubig, J. Remenyi & B. Quiñones, eds., Creating the Vision: Microfinancing the Poor in Asia-Pacific. 
Asian and Pacific Development Centre, Kuala Lumpur, 1997 
H. D. Seibel, G. M. Llanto, E. Garcia & R. Callanta, Microfinance in the Philippines, Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper  No. 2367, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus  
10 Dorothee Rojahn & Karl Osner, Report on the Self Evaluation Workshop of the Replications of the Grameen 
Bank Methodology in Asia. GTZ, Eschborn  5/1998 
11 As of 12/1995, the repayment dropped to 93%. The lowest rate was found among cooperative societies (86%), 
the highest among cooperative banks (98%), with NGOs in-between (98%).   10   
 
The program was found to be donor-driven; internal resource mobilization was minimal; interest rates 
were inadequate; and costs, shared about equally between government and replicators, were 
exorbitant, amounting to P0.47 per Peso lent and P1.70 per Peso saved, plus the costs of institution-
building (p. 77). The operational self-sufficiency ratio was 0.24 or lower.
12 Noting that ”excessive 
brokering of low-cost funds may discourage savings mobilization”, the authors (pp. 85-88) 
recommended:  
 
•  to offer attractive deposit interest rates and vigorously mobilize savings;  
•  to charge loan interest rates that cover at least the transaction costs;  
•  to cancel the program guarantee fund;  
•  to provide start-up assistance only; and  
•  to focus government support on ”institution-building, training and management rather than 
on supplying cheap credit.” (p.85-88)  
 
They concluded that ”... any attempt... to replicate or expand it (the program) should be carried out 
with great caution”.  
 
... or Struggling for Viability? 
 
In 1996, APDC, with UNDP support, carried out an assessment of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 
eleven Asian and Pacific countries, including seven MFIs in the Philippines: one cooperative bank 
and six NGOs. Six of the MFIs in the Philippines use the Grameen technology, but not all of them 
exclusively. As of end-1995, outreach ranged from 1,260 to 7,000 clients in the seven MFIs, 
averaging 3,000: a substantial (almost 15-fold) increase over the average for mid-1993. 90% of them 
were women; 94% were classified as poor. Average loans outstanding ranged f rom $30 to $467 
among the poor and from $1,500 to $2,600 among the non-poor. Savings mobilization continued to be 
weak, with a savings-to-loans outstanding ratio ranging from 0.05 to 0.41 and averaging 0.14.   
 
Table 3.1:  Viability indicators of seven MFIs in the Philippines,1995 
  Cost per average Peso 
of loan outstanding 
Degree of operational 
self-sufficiency in % 
Degree of financial 
self-sufficiency in % 
A  1.30  21  19 
B  1.00  8  7 
C  0.71  51  42 
D  0.48  67  48 
E  0.19  134  118 
F  0.29  113  93 
G  0.34  66  . 
 
 
Another remarkable development had occurred since 1993: a widening of the range between good and 
poor performance. Transaction costs per average Peso of loan outstanding varied  from 0.19 to 1.30; 
the operational self-sufficiency ratio varied from 0.08 to 1.34; and the financial self-sufficiency ratio 
(including adjustments for subsidies received and inflation) varied from 0.07 to 1.18. The cooperative 
bank (E in Table 1) performed best of all seven institutions. Two of the institutions learned a lesson 
                                                 
12 Calculated on the basis of Annex 15 of income and expenses in the ACPC report, plus a loan loss provision of 
3%. The actual ratio might be lower as it is not clear whether financial costs are included in the expenses. The 
ratio is 0.29 for cooperative banks, 0.24 for cooperatives and 0.20 for NGOs. No data are provided to calculate 
the financial self-sufficiency ratio.    11   
 
and applied for a rural bank license: CARD (C in Table 1), which since has been transformed into a 
bank; and TSPI (F in Table 1), which failed to meet recently increased equity capital requirements. 
Two of the institutions (A and C in Table 2) are the subject of case studies reported below. 
 
Grameen vs. Individual Technologies:  at what Costs and Benefits? 
 
In microfinance, there are two technologies which are sometimes debated among their 
adherents with almost religious fervor: group vs. individual technologies  - two different types 
of social capital. The Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna, Inc., the only bank and the only 
fully viable institution among the 7 MFIs (as of end-1995) studied by APDC in the 
Philippines, has an interesting story to tell. Established in 1977 by farmers‘ cooperatives, 
which own the bank, it serves both poor and non-poor clients, with poor women in the 
majority. Since 1991, it has been one of replicators in ACPC‘s Grameen program, thus 
combining regular and Grameen-type (“KPP”) operations. Does the Grameen approach 
enable an MFI to reach out to a poorer clientele? And, in doing so, can it cover its costs and 
even make a profit? The answer to the latter question is all the more interesting in face of 
overwhelming evidence from NGOs in the Philippines that Grameen-type banking is not 
viable.  
 
In 1995, the Bank served 1,792 borrowers ((74% poor, 90% women) and 2,583 savers (55% poor, 
81% women). Unlike non-bank replicators, which are not authorized to mobilize voluntary savings, 
the Bank offers passbook savings and time deposits. But given the abundance of donor funds, the 
savings ratio is only 0.14.  
 
In the field of credit, the Grameen program KPP has substantially increased the Bank‘s outreach: 
1,330 or 74% of the Bank's 1,792 borrowers fall under KPP. Under KPP, loans provided through 
savings groups have been increasing from 1% of total loans granted in 1993 to 15% in 1995. 
However, in terms of volume, the contribution of KPP borrowers, P3.15 million, to the Bank's total 
loan portfolio of P28.25 million outstanding is modest, comprising only 11%. Evidently, loans 
outstanding to poor women averaging P2,367 are far below the Bank's overall average, which is 
P15,763 per borrower. There are wide discrepancies in terms of average loans outstanding by sex and 
poverty status in 1995: the average size of loans was P9,987 for women and P66,545 for men; P2,367 
for the poor and P54,327 for the non-poor. 
 
In the field of outreach to savings depositors, the Grameen program KPP has more than doubled the 
Bank's outreach. All of the KPP's 1,415 participants have deposited savings in the Bank, compared to 
1,168 non-KPP depositors. Thus, 55% of all depositors are KPP participants. However, in terms of 
volume, their share is substantially lower, namely 23% of a total of P3.89 million, yet much higher 
than their credit share. This shows once again: the poor can save, and, in particular: women are good 
savers! The average size of savings in the bank was P1,506. Again, discrepancies exist, but they are 
by far not as wide as in the field of credit: women saved on average P1,192, men saved P2,826. The 
poor saved an average of P642, the non-poor P2,553. 
 
The total income of the bank per Peso of loan disbursed was an identical P0.26 for both the Grameen 
and entire bank operations. However, there is a substantial difference in magnitude and trend of net 
operating income over total performing assets, which is 0.33% for the KPP Grameen scheme (down 
from 0.46% in 1993) and 0.56% for the entire bank operations (up from 0.39% in 1993). Default rates 
resulting from bankwide operations appear within manageable limits but could be substantially 
improved. In the last three years, the ratio of past due loans to total loans outstanding was steady at 
17-18%. Collections on matured loans i mproved slightly from 85% to 89%. The recovery 
performance of the KPP Grameen scheme was substantially better, with a repayment rate of 97% in 
1995 (down from a high of 99% in 1993). The bank's earnings from interest income and fees covers 
more than its costs, with a degree of operational self-sufficiency (defined as the ratio of said earnings   12   
 
to total costs less depreciation) of 134% of the entire bank operations as well as the KPP Grameen 
scheme. 
 
Over the three-year period 1993-1995, the Bank has been profitable, and so has its Grameen scheme. 
During that period, the Bank's gross earnings averaged about P5.7 million and its costs P4.2 Million, 
yielding an annual average net income of over P1.4 million. The Bank profits from its Grameen 
scheme, but at 7% of net revenues only on a minimal scale.  
 
Table 3.2:  The Cooperative Rural Bank of Laguna Inc.: Grameen vs. entire bank operations, 
1995 
 
  Grameen operations   Entire bank operations 
Savers  1,415 (55%)  2,583 
Borrowers  1,330 (74%)  1,792 
Savings deposits (million P)  0.89 (23%)  3.89 
Loan portfolio (million P)  3.15 (11%)  28.25 
Loans outstanding per borrower (P)  2,367 (15%)  15,763 
Repayment rate, 1993ﬁ1995  99%ﬁ97%  85%ﬁ89% 
Total income per Peso disbursed  P0.26  P0.26 
Return on performing assets, 1993ﬁ1995  0.46ﬁ0.33  0.39ﬁ0.56 
Operational self-sufficiency ratio  1.34  1.34 
Net revenues  7%  100% 
 
The Bank has faced three constraints: a limitation in outreach; a not quite satisfactory repayment rate; 
and a weakness in savings mobilization. It has attempted to solve the first constraint by adopting the 
KPP Grameen replication scheme which has more than doubled its outreach in terms of numbers of 
clients. As the repayment rate in the KPP scheme has been far better than that of its cooperative 
clients, this has also contributed to a solution of its second constraint, but given the small size of the 
KPP loan portfolio only to an insignificant extent. No solution is in sight for its third constraint, weak 
savings mobilization. This is due, on the one hand, to zero or negative real returns on savings which 
could of course be remedied by increasing the rates of interest on both savings and loans which is 
optional for any institution. On the other hand, there seems to be little pressure on the bank to 
mobilize more s avings as long as it has access to governmental sources of easy money which are 
liberally replenished by international donors.  
 
The Bank has demonstrated the profitability of microfinance in two respects: both its own original 
operations with poor and non-poor members and its more recent operations with poor women under a 
Grameen-type replication scheme have covered their costs and yielded a profit. In terms of most 
performance indicators, its Grameen-type scheme with poor women organized in groups of five has 
been a success. Local outreach has surged; repayment rates are high; and the Bank makes a profit 
from the operation. Yet, the Bank's management is not enthusiastic. In quantitative terms, the volume 
of savings mobilized and loans disbursed to poor women is only an insignificant share of the bank's 
overall business, and so is the volume of profit derived from the KPP Grameen replication scheme. 
The management does not see enough potential in this market segment of poor women to argue that in 
the long run the Bank may contribute to the growth of their microenterprises and that these in turn 
will contribute to the growth of Bank. The management therefore considers terminating the KPP 
scheme which it finds profitable in relative but not in absolute terms.  
 
The Case of Ahon Sa Hirap Inc. (ASHI): Repayment through Grameen Discipline 
 
ASHI, the first Grameen replicator in the Philippines, started in 1989 as a social science research 
project of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños, with a grant of $50,000 from Cashpor, the 
regional network of Grameen replicators. In 9/1991, ASHI was registered as a non-profit, non-stock 
corporation, serving 100 beneficiaries in Laguna Province. At the same time, it provided Grameen   13   
 
consultancy services to various parishes. In 1992, the founder left the Philippines. By 1993, ASHI ran 
out of resources, depleted by administrative expenses and a drop of the repayment rate of its 1329 
borrowers to 58%. For every Peso lent, ASHI spent P1.23; its operating and financial self-sufficiency 
ratios stood at 0.16 and 0.14, respectively. A crisis of policy and management ensued.  
 
ASHI first decided to fully concentrate on Grameen banking and gave up its consultancy services. For 
reasons of economies of scale, it increased its branch network to five by taking over the Grameen 
activities of parishes it has previously assisted. As ASHI was not the only Grameen replicator in 
jeopardy, Cashpor organized a conference in the Philippines in 1994; GTZ of Germany and ACT of 
Belgium got involved; a Moment of Truth was defined; and a rehabilitation project was decided for 
three replicators. For six months, ASHI was practically run by a Cashpor consultant, who revamped 
the organization branch-by-branch and center-by-center, while the number of borrowers was allowed 
to drop to 1.226. He retrained all staff and rigidly restored the essentials of Grameen Banking which 
constitute the self-regulatory Grameen social capital, including regular attendance of weekly 
meetings, punctuality, pledge, seating arrangements and - absolute insistence on on-time repayment! 
In 1995, the headoffice moved to a more central location, Quezon City, from where it runs an 
excellent up-to-day MIS. The number of branches grew to seven, with a growth in all-female 
membership to  3,521 (3,210 or 91% of them borrowers) in 1996; 4,698 (4,447 or 93% borrowers) in 
1997 and 5,955 (5,717 or 96% borrowers) in 7/1998.  
 
As a result of the restored Grameen discipline, the repayment rate soared from 64.4% in 1994 to 
99.0% in 1995, hovering a round 97-98% thereafter (1996: 96.6%; 1997: 97.9%; 7/1998: 97.9%). 
Transaction costs were drastically lowered: from P1.23 per Peso lent in 1993 to P0.25 in 1997. 
Accordingly, the operational self-sufficiency ratio steadily increased from 0.16 in 1993 to 0.58 in 
1997, paralleled by an increase in the financial self-sufficiency ratio from 0.14 to 0.54 – still far from 
satisfactory, but on a promising course. With 60% of its loanable funds from grants and soft loans, 
financial self-sufficiency is not in sight.  
 
Table 3.3:  ASHI performance data, 1993-7/1998 
 
Year  No. of  
borrowers 
Borrowers 









1993  1329  87  58.0  1.23  0.16  0.14 
1994  1226  120  64.9  0.91  0.19  0.15 
1995  2437  140  99.0  0.77  0.29  0.22 
1996  3210  153  96.6  0.52  0.42  0.41 
1997  4447  156  97.9  0.25  0.57  0.54 
7/98  5717          ·  97.9      ·  ·  · 
Source: ASHI Annual Report 1997; Monthly Statement, 7/1998 
 
ASHI, though barred by law from mobilizing savings, is now trying to strengthen its deposit base. In 
addition to the usual compulsory savings and loan deductions, it has introduced a two-year children’s 
savings scheme, with weekly deposits of P50 or P100 at 4% interest p.a.
13 Loans of 6-12 months start 
with P2,000 ($46 by the 8/1998 exchange rate) and increase up to P10,000 in the fifth cycle. To 
increase its profitability, ASHI has added loans ranging from P15,000 to P50,000 ($345-$1150); and 
it is increasing its interest rate from 20% flat (approx. 37% effective) to 25% flat (approx. 46% 
effective) p.a.
14 Another new product is a one-month loan of P3-5000 with weekly instalments, at a 
flat interest rate of 6%. With viability and sustainability its future goal,  ASHI considers to convert the 
                                                 
13 At an inflation rate of 7.4%, this is equivalent to negative real returns of 3.4% 
14 For the larger loans, ASHI carries out creditworthiness examinations. At the time of the field visit, Mrs. D., 
after having received and repaid a number of loans from ASHI totaling P87,000, had submitted a new 
application for a livestock loan of P50,000, for which ASHI calculated a profit rate or 158%.   14   
 
compulsory 5% capital build-up deduction from all loans into shares and, within five years, transform 
the NGO into a cooperative bank owned by ASHI members and staff.
15 
 
The Case of CARD:  a Viable Grameen Rural Bank in the Philippines
16 
 
Inspired by the onset of a new era after the downfall of the Marcos regime, the Center for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (CARD) was one of numerous new NGOs established in 1986 and thereafter. 
With two grants of P150,000 each,  CARD, as of 1/1988, organized the poor in mixed groups of 15-
45 members, registered them as associations (including some spouses to reach the required minimum 
number of 21 members) and channeled short-term loans (3-6 months) of P1,000 to each member. 
With negotiable repayment schedules, this turned out to be a false start. After eight months, only the 
two groups which had opted for monthly instalments had repaid their loan. The remaining five, with 
lump sum repayment upon maturity, defaulted. The overall repayment rate during that year was 68%. 
Under donor pressure, CARD was either to close or revamp its operations.  
 
In late 1988, the president of CARD visited the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Deeply impressed by 
the ability of the poor to engage in income-generating activities and repay their loans on time, he 
decided, upon his return, to adopt the Grameen approach, organizing poor women in groups of 5 and 
centers of 30. This, however, met with considerable opposition. The complex Grameen discipline, 
including weekly meetings and weekly instalments, were greatly disliked, particularly by the men. 
Four of the associations left the project; 89 poor women agreed to participate in a pilot test, from 
January to December 1989. Credit discipline, which is one of the most outstanding achievements of 
the Grameen approach, produced repayment rates of 98.0%-100.0% since 1994. This impressed BSP, 
the central bank, so much that it consented to fully non-collateralized lending when CARD later 
established itself as a rural bank 
 
But active membership grew only slowly: to 307 in 1990, 468 in 1991, 949 in 1992 and 1,711 in 
1993. 1990-96 were years of experimentation to modify the Grameen technology. CARD developed 
its own training system and operations manual; substituted 6 -months first-loans for one-year loans; 
required a minimum self-financing ratio of 25% from repeat borrowers; introduced a mutual life and 
accident insurance fund; replaced group funds by center funds; offered multipurpose loans for prime 
borrowers; added voluntary withdrawable savings (ignoring the law which bars NGOs from deposit 
taking); and, finally, provided a staff incentive scheme. Active membership soared from 1,711 in 
1993 to 6,844 in 1996. By 1996, nonwithdrawable compulsory savings stood at P12m, voluntary 
savings at P1m. Operational self-sufficiency, which had declined from 0.31 in 1991 to 0.25 in 1992, 
went up to 0.46 in 1993, 0.77 in 1996 and 1.00 in 1999. 
 
In May 1996, CARD submitted its application to establish a rural bank, which was approved in 
December. This means that CARD Bank now falls under the regulation and supervision of the central 
Bank, which, according to our hypothesis mobilizes an entirely new quality of CARD’s social capital. 
 
After having deposited P5m as paid-up capital with Landbank, CARD Rural Bank (RB) formally 
opened on 1 September 1997. There are now two institutions: CARD RB for financial intermediation, 
with 5 branches, and CARD NGO for group formation and guidance including financial 
intermediation in areas not covered by a CARD RB branch, with 16 branches. in the island provinces 
of Masbate, Marinduque and Mindoro. An application for branching-out has been submitted to the 
central bank, in order to bring all financial activities under the roof of CARD RB. Due to legal 
restrictions, CARD NGO owns only 25% of CARD RB; the rest is owned by five board members and 
staff, who have entered into a trust agreement with the NGO.  
                                                 
15 Special microfinance training courses, including the preparation of custom-made training materials and 
operational manuals, may be arranged by ASHI through INSOL (ahon@i-manila.com.ph). 
16 For a detailed presentation see: Hans Dieter Seibel & Dolores Torres: Are Grameen Replications Sustainable, 
and Do The Reach the Poor? The Case of CARD Rural Bank in the Philippines. Journal of Microfinance (ISSN 
1527-4314) Vol. 1 No. 1, 1999: 117-130.   15   
 
 
Transformation into a bank appears to have greatly facilitated the growth of group membership, which 
soared to 10,868 in 1997 and 28,531 in 1999.  CARD RB has ambitious goals: 50,000 active members 
by 2000 and 150,000 by 2002. 
 
The Bank offers passbook savings at 5% and fixed deposits, ranging from a minimum of P10,000 for 
one month at 7% interest to P500,000 for 12 months at 15%: all above the usual commercial bank 
rates. As of July 1998, the savings deposit balance was P14m. There are five loan products, all with 
weekly instalments: regular loans increasing from a first loan of P2,000 to a fourth loan of P10,000; 
asset acquisition loans up to P50,000; housing loans up to P20,000; short-term multipurpose loans up 
P5,000; and prime-borrower loans up to P100,000. Maturities range from 12-75 weeks; but most are 
50 weeks. Interest rates are 20% flat, plus an upfront service fee of 4%; effective annual interest rates 
are 45.6%-53.8%.  
 
Table 3.4:  CARD  performance data, 1988 - December 1999 
 












1988  150  68.0         
1989  89  100.0    89     
1990  307  98.0    307     
1991  468  96.0    468  0.31   
1992  949  98.2    949  0.25   
1993  1,711  98.1    1,711  0.46   
1994  3,547  98.0    3,547  0.77   
1995  4,240  98.8  0.17  4,240  0.46  0.42 
1996  6,844  99.2  0.12  6,844  0.77  0.68 
1997  10,868  100.0  0.00  10,954  1.22  0.73 
1998  20,617  99.9  0.06  20,880  1.00  0.73 
1999  28,531  100.0    40,367  1.00  0.86 
Source: Dolores M. Torres, Managing Delinquency and Quality Portfolio, 8/1998; Annual Statement, 12/1999 
 
In 7/1998, the loan portfolio of CARD Rural Bank amounted to P32m, that of CARD NGO to P38m. 
By December 1998, the portfolio had increased to P39.0m (6,530 borrowers) and P44.3m (14,087 
borrowers), respectively: a total of P83.3m (20,617 borrowers). Deposits in 12/1998 amounted to 
P14.8m (38.0 of loans outstanding) in CARD RB and P10.9m (24.7% of loans outstanding) in CARD 
NGO: totaling P25.8m (30.9% of loans outstanding). Together, equity and deposits account for 37.0% 
of loans outstanding. Each of the two entities recently obtained a loan of P15m from the People’s 
Credit and Finance Corporation, PCFC , which is funded by ADB and IFAD, at 12% interest p.a. and 
a 1% annual service fee on the outstanding balance. Other donors include CGAP and Grameen Trust. 
 
Transformation into a rural bank, which included a preparatory phase in 1996-97, seems to have 
brought CARD closer to its desired sustainability goals: the cost efficiency ratio (cost per Peso lent) 
improved from 0.69 in 1995 to 0.33 in 1997; the operational self-sufficiency ratio climbed from 0.46 
in 1995 to 0.77 in 1996, 1.22 in 1997 and 1.00 in 1998 and 1999 (with 234 borrowers per field staff), 
financial self-sufficiency (adjusted for subsidies and inflation) grew from 42% in 1995 to 68% in 
1996, 73% in 1997 and 1998, and 86% in 1999. CARD branch viability (operational self-sufficiency 
ratio of at least 1.0) increased rapidly: from none out of eight branches in 1995 to four out of ten in 
1996 and eight out of 13 in 1997. 
   16   
 
Card Rural Bank has proven that outreach to the poor and operational viability are not only 
compatible: they are mutually reinforcing.
17 As to financial self-reliance and full financial self-
sufficiency, the Bank has made great progress in recent years. However, continued access to easy 
donor money may hamper the bank’s effort to vigorously mobilize deposits and, in the case of 
devaluations, inordinately augment the country’s external endebtedness in Peso terms.
18  
 
The social capital of Grameen microfinance institutions 
Is the Grameen approach a type of social capital that can be exported world-wide, with a success 
similar to that of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh? Does the Grameen approach provide an optimal 
solution to the problem of how to provide financial services to the poor? We have looked at two 
criteria, outreach and institutional viability (ignoring a third, namely impact). In the Philippines, the 
outreach of Grameen replicators has been negligible compared to the totality of financial services 
provided by other microfinance institutions. All replications are donor-driven. Donor-dependency has 
undermined their viability. Only few of the institutions are operationally self-sufficient, covering their 
costs from their income. In some cases, even effective annual interest rates around 50% (or real rates, 
adjusted for inflation, around 40%) were not sufficient to cover the costs of the Grameen technology. 
But all of the institutions examined, which are of course only those who have survived, have 
progressed in this respect and might, eventually, be operationally fully viable.  
 
Sustainability, however, is  not in sight in any of the replicating institutions (unless Grameen 
replication is a side activity). None even remotely approaches an adequate level of internal resource 
mobilization; nor does anyone earn enough revenues to cover all operating, financial and loan loss 
expenses and the value of adjustments for subsidies and inflation. The biggest obstacle in the 
development of the Grameen replicators has been donor support: a powerful incentive to substitute 
external resources for local savings.
19 Only domestic savings have a chance to grow dynamically; 
government and donor dole-outs do not. It seems speculative at this point to predict if financial self-
sufficiency might ever be reached by any of the institutions. However, those who adhere to the pure 
and unadjusted Grameen technology and insist on banking with the poor only are unlikely to 
withstand the growing competition of other MFIs  in the long run. 
 
Our initial question was: do the Grameen replicators reach the poor, and are they sustainable? 
According to the limited evidence presented in this paper, the answer is: They are not sustainable; and 
therefore, they do not reach the poor in sufficient numbers. It appears that the Grameen approach is no 
magic formula, and no best practice or unique and optimal solution that may be applied around the 
world to alleviate poverty. I am not aware that any such optimal solution or best practice ever existed, 
or may ever be found. However, there may be sound practices, which work for a certain time under 
certain conditions and may compete with other sound practices.  
 
There are a number of sound practices which may explain some of the success of some of the 
replicators. It appears that successful replicators share a least the following three sound practices, 
constituting perhaps the hard core social capital of the original Grameen approach: 
 
•  high moral commitment of leaders based on values enforced through training 
•  peer selection and peer enforcement, precluding adverse selection and moral hazard 
                                                 
17 This is also confirmed by Rojahn & Osner (p. 12) who observed that Grameen replicators which are low in 
operational viability are also low in outreach, while replicators high in viability are also high in outreach. 
18 CARD (card@msc.net.ph)  is prepared to share its experience. Since 1996, it has trained 2,500 people in 
courses of one to two weeks length. Training is conducted in English, at P500 ($11.50) per day.  
19 This conclusion is shared by the authors of a GTZ (Bieding et al. 1998:79) study of the financial sector in the 
Philippines, who “do not recommend promoting Grameen Bank replicators at the institutional level because the 
model is not currently implemented in a sustainable manner in the Philippines. This is seen in the context of ”the 
need to revise the system of incentives created by national and international donors. These have accorded  
precedence to disbursing short-term credit to target groups over the institutional and financial sustainability of 
the programs and institutions.”   17   
 
•  credit discipline, including weekly instalments; rigid insistence on timely repayment; and 
repeat loans of growing sizes contingent upon repayment performance. 
 
It further appears that the most promising replicators are the innovators who have experimented with 
modifications to t he classical replication model, constituting  additional core social capital 
dimensions outside of Bangladesh, among them in particular: 
 
•  local bank status (rather than NGO or national bank status) 
•  deposit mobilization through differentiated products with attractive interest rates 
•  differentiated loan and insurance products which cover all costs and risks  
•  client differentiation through larger-size loan and deposit products for non-poor members. 
 
Grameen-type MFIs in the Philippines are only successful to the extent they have implemented these 
criteria – and unsuccessful to the extent they have failed to do so. We may tentatively consider the 
seven points listed above as the essence of the social capital of Grameen-type institutions in the 
Philippines and perhaps worldwide. Depending on the policy environment, the legal framework, the 
microfinance infrastructure, and particular circumstances (such as natural disasters, which may 
preclude timely repayment), most of these practices may be recommended for emulation, both  by 
Grameen and non-Grameen MFIs, though not for mechanical replication. There is no reason why a 
Grameen-type MFI, which registers as a bank, mobilizes its own resources through differentiated 
savings products, o ffers differentiated loan and insurance products which cover all costs and risks, 
and provides larger-size loan and deposit products to its non-poor members, should not become viable 
and financially self-sufficient and offer sustainable financial services to an ever-growing number of 
poor, and eventually non-poor, clients. However, whether it will do all this, depends on the will of its 
board and management. There is no regulatory authority supervising and enforcing these requirements 
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